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ABSTRACT
Long-term data for 30 countries up to 2006 reveal 232 stock-market crashes (multi-year real returns
of –25% or less) and 100 depressions (multi-year macroeconomic declines of 10% or more), with
71 of the cases matched by timing.  The United States has two of the matched events—the Great Depression
1929–33 and the post-WWI years 1917–21, likely driven by the Great Influenza Epidemic.  41% of
the matched cases are associated with war, and the two world wars are prominent.  Conditional on
a stock-market crash (return of –25% or less) in a non-war environment, the probability of a minor
depression (macroeconomic decline of at least 10%) is 22% and of a major depression (at least 25%)
is 3%.  For contexts of currency or banking crises that occur during times of global distress, these
probabilities rise to 46% and 8%, respectively. These depression odds applied to the stock-market
crashes of 2008 in the United States and many other countries.  In reverse and again in a non-war environment,
the probability of a stock-market crash (return of –25% or worse) is 67%, conditional on a depression
of 10% or more, and 83% for 25% or more.  Thus, the largest depressions are particularly likely to
be accompanied by stock-market crashes.  We allow for flexible timing between stock-market crashes
and depressions for the 71 matched cases to compute the covariance between stock returns and an
asset-pricing factor, which depends on the proportionate decline of consumption during a depression.
 If we assume a coefficient of relative risk aversion around 3.5, this covariance is large enough to account
in a familiar looking asset-pricing formula for the observed average (levered) equity premium of 7%
per year.  This finding complements previous analyses that were based on the probability and size
distribution of macroeconomic disasters but did not consider explicitly the covariance between macroeconomic













jfursua@fas.harvard.edu“Wall Street indexes predicted nine out of the last five recessions!” Samuelson (1966). 
  The Samuelson quote is remarkable because it is simultaneously extremely clever and 
extremely misleading.  We find, for 30 countries with long-term data, that stock-market crashes 
(cumulated multi-year real returns of –25 percent or less) go along with minor depressions 
(multi-year declines of consumption or GDP by 10 percent or more) 31 percent of the time and 
major depressions (declines by 25 percent or more) 10 percent of the time.  In reverse, minor 
depressions feature stock-market crashes 71 percent of the time, whereas major depressions 
feature these crashes 92 percent of the time.  Thus, as the Samuelson quote suggests, stock-
market crashes are far more frequent than depressions.  Nevertheless, a stock-market crash 
provides good reason for concern about the macro economy—because the conditional 31 percent 
chance of a minor depression and 10 percent chance of a major depression are far above the 
typical probabilities.  In reverse, the absence of a stock-market crash is reassuring in the sense 
that a depression is highly unlikely.   
  The overall probability of moving from a “normal state” into a minor depression turns out 
to be 3.8 percent per year (3 per century).  But knowing that there is no stock-market crash 
lowers the odds to 1.0 percent per year (1 per century).  For a major depression, the overall 
probability is 0.9 percent per year (1 per century), but conditioning on no stock-market crash 
reduces this chance to 0.07 percent per year (less than 1 per millennium).  Hence, although 
Samuelson is right in some sense, stock returns still provide important guidance about the 
prospects for depression.  This kind of information is particularly valuable in the financially 
turbulent environment of 2008–09. 
  In the first part of this paper, covering sections I and II, we study the extent to which 
stock-market crashes have predictive power for depressions by analyzing their frequency 
distributions from a long-term and cross-country perspective. Part of this analysis entails 
splitting the sample into different “bins” or categories, defined by the magnitudes of the stock-
market crashes or by the type of environment that characterized those events; for example, wars, 
currency or banking crises, and periods of global economic distress. An important aspect of this 
analysis is the flexibility in the matching of events according to their timing.  Excluding 
exceptional cases that involve measurement problems, including price controls, stock-market 2 
 
crashes tend to occur slightly prior to macroeconomic contractions. Therefore, the “predictive” 
power that we isolate for stock-market crashes with respect to depressions typically constitutes 
predictability in the usual chronological sense. 
  In Section III, we study some of the asset-pricing implications from our matching of 
stock-market crashes with depressions. This work complements the analysis of the equity 
premium in Barro and Ursúa (2008) by considering the co-movement between macroeconomic 
declines and stock-market returns in the form of a “flexible covariance analysis.” The matched 
cases of stock-market crashes and depressions provide most of the explanatory power for 
generating a reasonable equity premium with a familiar asset-pricing formula.  The required 
coefficient of relative risk aversion is in the range of three to four.  Section IV concludes and 
sketches plans for future research. 
 
I.  Stock-Market Crashes and Depressions in the Long-Term International Data 
 
  This study uses an updated version of the macroeconomic and stock-return data described 
in Barro and Ursúa (2008).  For the macroeconomic aggregates, we have annual time series from 
before 1914 for real per capita consumer expenditure, C, for 24 countries and real per capita 
GDP for 36 countries.  Our earlier study and the online information available at 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro provide a detailed description 
of the methods and sources used to construct the data on C and GDP.
1 
  For stock returns, the data come mainly from Global Financial Data (described in Taylor 
[2005]).
2  When available, we used nominal total return indexes, deflated by consumer price 
                                                            
1 Barro and Ursúa (2008) compare our GDP data with those in Maddison (2003).  One problem with the Maddison 
data is his propensity to interpolate in poorly documented ways over periods with missing data.  
2 We use the data from Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (DMS), available through Morningstar, for Canada 1900–13, 
Denmark 1900–14, Italy 1900–05, Netherlands 1900–19, Sweden 1900–01, Switzerland 1900–10, and South Africa 
1900–10. Care should be taken in using the DMS data for later periods, usually wars, with missing entries in Global 
Financial Data. These DMS data appear to be generated (for periods such as France 1940 and Portugal 1974–77 
when stock-return data seem to be unavailable) by interpolation.  We have not used any of this information. We use 
stock-price data for Argentina 1900–35 from Nakamura and Zarazaga (2003), for Japan 1893–1914 from Fujino and 
Akiyama (1977), and for Mexico 1902–29 (missing 1915–18) from Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003).  For Brazil 
1900–1942 we used data generously provided by Aldo Musacchio, and for 1945–1953 we used data from Goldsmith 
(1986). 3 
 
indexes, to compute annual, arithmetic real rates of return.  In other cases, we used nominal 
stock-price composite indexes, deflated by consumer price indexes, and then added estimates (or 
sometimes actual values) of dividend yields to estimate the arithmetic real rates of return.  The 
present study focuses on 30 countries (20 OECD) with annual stock-return data since at least the 
early 1930s.  Our annual real rates of return apply from the end of the previous year to the end of 
the current year.
3 
  As in Barro and Ursúa (2008), we gauge “depressions” by peak-to-trough declines in real 
per capita consumer expenditure, C, or GDP.  These declines can apply to multiple years, such as 
1912 to 1918 for Germany during World War I, 1929 to 1933 for the U.S. Great Depression, 
1935 to 1937 during the Spanish Civil War, 1938 to 1943 for France in World War II, 1972 to 
1976 covering the Pinochet coup in Chile, 1981 to 1988 in Mexico during the Latin American 
debt crisis, and 1989 to 1993 during the financial crisis in Finland.
4  In the main analysis, we 
follow our previous study in focusing on contractions in C or GDP of size 0.10 or more.   
However, we also consider higher thresholds for labeling an economic decline as a depression. 
  In terms of asset pricing, the analysis maps more closely to consumption than to GDP.  
However, our C measures refer, because of data availability, to personal consumer expenditure, 
rather than consumption.  Moreover, in many cases, the measurement error in C is likely to be 
greater than that in GDP.  The analysis in Barro and Ursúa (2008, section V) found that major 
contractions in C and GDP were similar overall in terms of timing.  The average proportionate 
size of contraction was also similar during non-war periods.  However, because of the large 
expansion in military purchases during wars, the average proportionate contraction in C during 
wartime was, on average, five percentage points greater than that in GDP.  For example, the 
United Kingdom had depressions gauged by C during the two world wars but not by GDP.  
Moreover, some non-war aftermaths, such as the United States from 1944 to 1947, featured 
substantial declines in GDP but not in C—because of the massive demobilization that featured 
                                                            
3 For many cases with missing data, usually during wars and sometimes because of closed markets, we were able to 
compute cumulative multi-year real returns across the gaps.  These cases are Belgium 1914–18 and 1944–46, France 
1940–41, India 1926–27, Mexico 1915–18, Netherlands 1944–46, Spain 1936–40, Portugal 1974–77, and 
Switzerland 1914–16.  However, we could not use this approach for Brazil 1943–1944, or countries with larger gaps 
in the stock-return data:  Argentina 1958–66, Austria 1939–44, Greece 1941–52, and Indonesia 1940–77. 
4 In Barro and Ursúa (2008) and in our main analysis here, we sometimes have intermediate years with small 
increases in C or GDP.   However, the results do not change a lot if we constrain multi-year contractions to have 
declines in C or GDP for every year included in the multi-year interval. 4 
 
sharp declines in military purchases.  This kind of post-war event does not constitute a 
depression in an economic sense. 
  Putting these results together, we decided to measure macroeconomic contractions during 
non-war years as the average of those found in C and GDP.  (If only one of the variables was 
available—in practice, GDP but not C—we gauged the contraction by the available variable.)  In 
war aftermaths, we used only the information on C (and left the data as missing when only GDP 
was available).  In war periods, we typically used only the data on C.  However, we used an 
average of C and GDP when the contraction indicated by GDP was larger or when only the GDP 
data were available and the indicated contraction size was at least 0.10.  For the 30 countries in 
the present study (3037 annual observations), this procedure yields 100 cases of macroeconomic 
contraction of size 0.10 or more. 
  We now apply an analogous peak-to-trough procedure to gauge stock-market crashes.  In 
our main analysis, we focus on cumulative, multi-year real returns that were –0.25 or less.  For 
the 30 countries, this procedure yields 232 cases of stock-market crashes. 
  Table 1 illustrates our methodology for U.S. data since 1869.  We found 7 stock-market 
crashes (not including 2008, since our main sample goes to 2006), using the definition of 
cumulative real returns of –0.25 or less.
5  The worst is –0.55 for 1929–31 (Great Depression), 
followed by –0.49 for 1973–74, –0.47 for 1916–20, and –0.42 for 2000–02.  The value –0.37 for 
2008 (using data only through 2008) would be worth fifth place if it were included in the sample.  
The others are –0.32 for 1907, –0.37 for 1937, and –0.29 for 1939–41. 
  We matched stock-market crashes with depressions (macroeconomic contractions of size 
0.10 or more) by finding periods that were coincident or adjacent.  Table 1 illustrates our general 
procedure by providing the details for the United States from 1869 to 2006.  The first two 
columns refer to the stock-market crashes, of which there were seven up to 2006 (and one more 
for 2008).  The “macro contraction” in columns 7 and 8 is calculated by the method described 
earlier from the C and GDP declines shown in columns 3–6.  The United States from 1869 to 
2006 experienced only two periods with macro contractions of size 0.10 or more—the Great 
                                                            
5 The October 1987 U.S. stock-market crash does not show up as a decline for the full year.  However, 1987 does 
appear as a sharp fall in the annual data for many other countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Denmark, France, 
Germany, India, Italy, Mexico, Norway, and Switzerland. 5 
 
Depression of 1929–33, with a contraction of 0.25, and 1917–21, with a decline by 0.16.  As 
discussed in Barro and Ursúa (2008, section III), the 1917–21 contraction likely reflects the 
Great Influenza Epidemic, rather than World War I, per se.  The other five periods with stock-
market crashes were not associated with depressions, although 1906–08 comes close; 1937–38, 
1973–75, and 2000–01 are all recession periods; and 1941–42 shows a decline in C but not in 
GDP.  Of course, we do not yet know what will happen in the years following 2008.  Note also 
that, unlike many other countries, the United States from 1869 to 2006 had no depressions that 
were not associated with stock-market crashes. 
  We applied the same methodology to all 30 countries (20 OECD) with long-term data on 
stock returns and the macroeconomic variables (at least GDP).
6  The matching of periods of 
stock-market crashes with those of macroeconomic declines were sometimes less clear cut than 
for the United States, but these considerations appear to be minor overall.  Table 2, panel A lists 
the 71 cases of stock-market crashes (returns of –0.25 or less) that paired up with depressions 
(macro contractions of 0.10 or more)—as already noted, two of these are for the United States.  
In this sample, the average stock return was –0.53, with an average duration of 3.8 years, and the 
average macroeconomic contraction size was 0.23, with an average duration of 4.1 years. 
  Panel B lists the 29 cases of depressions that were not associated with stock-market 
crashes—of which there were none for the United States.  In this sample, the average stock 
return was –0.09, with an average duration of 1.7 years, and the average macroeconomic 
contraction size was 0.17, with an average duration of 3.8 years.  There are another 161 cases (5 
for the United States) of stock-market crashes not associated with depressions, but these are not 
shown in the table.  The average stock return in this group was –0.43, with an average duration 
of 2.9 years, and the average contraction size was 0.01, with an average duration of 1.5 years. 
  Among the 71 cases of paired stock-market crashes and depressions shown in Table 2, 
panel A, 16 are associated with World War II (including the neutral countries Spain, Sweden, 
and Switzerland), 13 with the Great Depression of the early 1930s, and 10 with World War I 
(including Sweden and Switzerland).  There are 8 pairings associated with the Latin American 
                                                            
6 The countries with long-term data on GDP but not C are Greece, Indonesia, New Zealand, and South Africa.  In 
addition, Austria has a major gap in the C series around World War II.  In many other cases, the GDP data start well 
before the C data. 6 
 
debt crisis of the 1980s, 10 other post-World War II cases in Latin America, and 6 events with 
troughs in 1920–21, likely reflecting the Great Influenza Epidemic.  The other cases involve 
Japan during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), the Mexican Revolution and Civil War (1910–
20), the culmination of the German hyperinflation (1922–23), the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), 
India during the post-WWII conflict with Pakistan (1947–48), the peaceful (“Carnation”) 
revolution in Portugal (1974–75), the early 1990s financial crisis in Finland, and the 1997–98 
Asian Financial Crisis in Indonesia.   
  In Table 2, a bold entry for the macroeconomic period indicates a time of war (defined to 
include only active combatants).
7  Overall, 41 percent of the cases in Panel A (29 of 71) are 
associated with war. 
  Table 2, panel A misses a number of paired stock-market crashes and depressions other 
than that for Indonesia during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s because the countries 
involved lack the long-term stock-return data needed to qualify for our sample.  For example, 
South Korea has a stock return of –0.63 for 1995–97 and a macro contraction of 0.11 for 1997–
98, Malaysia has a stock return of –0.54 for 1997–98 and a macro contraction of 0.11 for 1997–
98, and Thailand has a stock return of –0.81 for 1995–98 and a macro contraction of 0.14 for 
1996–98.  Our sample also excludes recent cases in Russia and other former Communist 
countries that lack long-term data. 
  In Table 2, panel B, for the 29 cases of depression unaccompanied by stock-market 
crashes, 7 are related to World War II (including the neutral country Portugal), 6 with the Great 
Depression, 4 with World War I (including the neutral country Chile), and 1 probably with the 
Great Influenza Epidemic.  Other cases were the depression in Australia in the early 1890s, 
Argentina 1899–1900, Canada in 1906–08 (likely related to the U.S. financial panic of 1907), 
Brazil 1907–09, Mexico in the early 1920s, Denmark in 1946–48, France around 1871 (Franco-
Prussian War), France in the 1880s, Portugal at the time of the Spanish Civil War in 1934–36, 
Spain in the 1890s, and South Africa in the mid 1980s (possibly related to international sanctions 
                                                            
7We used Correlates of War, inter- and intra-state conflicts (Sarkees [2000]), and other sources to designate times of 
“major” war.  In Table 2, the conflicts designated as war for active combatants are Franco-Prussian War 1870–71, 
Russo-Japanese War 1904–05, World War I 1914–18, Mexican Revolution and Civil War 1909–18, Mexican War 
of the Cristeros 1926–29, Spanish Civil War 1936–39, World War II 1939–45, India-Pakistan War 1947–48, 
Pinochet coup in Chile 1973, Portugal Carnation Revolution 1974–75, Argentina during the Falklands War 1982, 
and Peru’s guerrilla conflicts 1987–92. 7 
 
against Apartheid).  Overall, 28 percent of these cases (8 of 29) are associated with war.  In 
contrast, for the 161 cases of stock-market crashes not associated with depressions, only 11 (7 
percent) are associated with war. 
 
II.  Frequencies of Stock-Market Crashes and Depressions 
 
  Table 3 shows the overall frequency of stock-market crashes, defined as cumulative 
multi-year returns of –0.25 or less—or, as alternative thresholds, –0.40 or less and –0.50 or less.  
The table also shows the frequency of macroeconomic contractions, defined as cumulative multi-
year declines by at least 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, or 0.30.  Part A of the table combines non-war 
and war observations, Part B distinguishes non-war from war events, and part C considers non-
war samples related to currency, banking, and global crises. 
  Begin with Part A of Table 3 and consider the pairing (–0.25, 0.10), which was used 
before.  By this definition, the overall sample (30 countries, 3037 annual observations) has 232 
stock-market crashes and 100 macro contractions.  The average durations were 3.2 years for the 
stock-market crashes and 4.0 years for the macro contractions.  When expressed as a probability 
per year of moving from “normalcy” into each state, the values are 0.101 for the stock-market 
crashes and 0.038 for the macro contractions.  Thus, as Samuelson suggested, stock-market 
crashes are far more frequent than depressions—reflecting the much greater volatility of stock 
returns than of consumption or GDP growth rates. 
  Among the 232 stock-market crashes and 100 macro contractions, Table 3, part A shows 
that 71 were matched events—occurring over overlapping or adjacent years.  Thus, 31 percent 
and 71 percent, respectively, of the stock-market crashes and macro contractions are paired with 
the other decline.  To put it another way, if one knows that a stock-market crash (return of –0.25 
or less) occurred, it is 31 percent probable that a depression (of size 0.10 or more) also occurred.  
In terms of applications, this finding has predictive content because the typical pattern is for 
stock-market crashes to precede, to some extent, depressions.  Conversely, it one knows that a 
depression (of size 0.10 or more) occurred, it is 71 percent probable that a stock-market crash (of 
size –0.25 or worse) also occurred. 8 
 
  Not surprisingly, the probability of depression, conditional on observing a stock-market 
crash, declines as one raises the standard for declaring a depression.  Table 3, part A indicates 
that, conditional on a stock-market crash (–0.25 or worse), the probability of depression is 0.31 
for size 0.10 or more, 0.19 for size 0.15 or more, 0.13 for size 0.20 or more, 0.10 for size 0.25 or 
more, and 0.07 for size 0.30 or more. 
  In the reverse direction, the probability of a stock-market crash, conditional on seeing a 
depression, becomes larger the higher the standard for labeling a macro contraction as a 
depression.  Table 3, part A shows that the conditional probability of a stock-market crash   
(–0.25 or less) goes from 0.71 when depressions are of size 0.10 or more to 0.73 at 0.15, 0.78 at 
0.20, 0.92 at 0.25, and 0.94 at 0.30.  Thus, the largest depressions are almost surely accompanied 
by stock-market crashes.  (Table 2, panel B shows that the two largest depressions not 
accompanied by stock-market crashes were in Australia—in the early 1890s and during World 
War II.)  Another way to view the result is that, if one knows that there is no stock-market crash, 
it is extremely unlikely that a major depression exists.   
  The results can be expressed as probabilities per year of entering into various states. 
Without knowing whether there is a stock-market crash, the unconditional probability per year of 
moving from “normalcy” into a major depression (0.25 or more) is 0.0089 per year, a little less 
than 1 per century.  Knowing that there is no stock-market crash lowers these odds by a factor of 
10 to 0.0007 per year, less than 1 per millennium.  The change is less dramatic if one considers 
depressions of size 0.10 or more.  In this case, the unconditional probability per year of entering 
into a depression is 0.038 per year (3–4 per century), whereas conditioning on no stock-market 
crash lowers the chance to 0.010 per year (1 per century).  In other words, the conditioning 
reduces the depression odds by a factor of roughly four.   
  Table 3, part A also considers the breakpoint of –0.40 or less for declaring a stock-market 
crash.  The number of these larger crashes is 124, corresponding to a probability of 0.049 per 
year of entering into this state.  Among the 100 macro contractions of size 0.10 or more, 50 are 
paired with a stock-market crash of –0.40 or worse.  Conditional on observing a stock-market 
crash of this larger magnitude, the probability of seeing a depression (0.10 or more) is higher 
than before, 0.40 versus 0.31.  Similarly, the chance of encountering a depression of any given 
size (0.15 or more, and so on) is greater when the stock-market crash is –0.40 or worse, rather 9 
 
than –0.25 or worse.  For example, for a stock-market crash of –0.40 or worse, the chance of 
seeing a major depression (size 0.25 or more) is 0.15, compared to 0.10 from before.  The overall 
tendency, as would be expected, is that the depression odds go up as the observed size of the 
stock-market crash increases.  
  Table 3, part A also has results for samples limited to the 20 OECD countries.  The 
patterns are similar to those for the group of 30 countries.  Thus, in the sample that combines 
non-war and war events, the predictive element of a stock-market crash is about the same in 
developed countries as in a set of middle-income countries from Latin America and Asia 
(although stock returns and growth rates of macroeconomic aggregates are more volatile in the 
middle-income countries). 
  Table 3, part B shows the results that separate non-war from war events.  In the non-war 
sample, considered in columns 3–5, the biggest change from before is the decrease in depression 
probability, conditional on seeing a stock-market crash.  For all 30 countries, for a stock-market 
crash of –0.25 or worse, the conditional probability of a minor depression (0.10 or more) is now 
0.22, compared to 0.31 in the combined sample, and of a major depression (0.25 or more) is only 
0.03, rather than 0.10.  For a stock-market crash of –0.40 or worse, the probability of a minor 
depression is now 0.30, compared to 0.40, and the probability of a major depression is 0.04, 
compared to 0.15.  For the OECD, the changes are in the same direction but more pronounced 
than for the overall sample.  The sample of OECD non-war events has only three major 
depressions—Australia in the 1890s (which did not have a stock-market crash) and the Great 
Depression in Canada and the United States (which had stock-market crashes). 
  We can apply the findings from the non-war sample to the 2008–09 environment, in 
which many countries experienced stock-market crashes (returns of –0.25 or worse) but not 
major wars.  For example, for the United States through the end of 2008, the stock-market return 
was –0.37, close to the value –0.40 included in Table 3, part B.  This size of stock-market crash 
implied (for the full sample of countries in a non-war environment) a probability of minor 
depression (0.10 or more) of 22 percent and a probability of major depression (0.25 or more) of 3 
percent. 10 
 
  The war sample is considered in columns 6–8 of Table 3, part B.  The main change from 
the sample that includes all events is the much higher probability of depression, conditional on 
observing a stock-market crash.  For all 30 countries, for a stock-market crash of –0.25 or worse, 
the conditional probability of a minor depression (0.10 or more) is now 0.73, compared to 0.22 in 
the non-war sample, and of a major depression (0.25 or more) is 0.45, rather than 0.03.  These 
results are similar for the OECD group.  Thus, in a wartime context, a stock-market crash is 
highly predictive of depression (perhaps because of the signal that a country is doing badly 
during the war). 
  In contrast, the probability of a stock-market crash, contingent on seeing a depression, is 
similar for the war and non-war samples.  For example, for a minor depression (0.10 or more), 
the conditional probability of a stock-market crash (–0.25 or less) in the sample of 30 countries is 
0.67 for the non-war sample and 0.78 for the war sample.  For a major depression (0.25 or more), 
the conditional probability of a stock-market crash is 0.83 for the non-war sample and 0.95 for 
the war sample. Thus, in peace and war, depressions—especially the larger ones—are highly 
likely to be accompanied by stock-market crashes. 
  Table 3, part C, shows results obtained by restricting the sample to stock-market crashes 
and depressions occurring during non-war times and in the context of currency or banking crises, 
global crises, or both categories jointly.
8  For currency and banking crises, we used country-
specific yearly indicators assembled by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff.
9  We linked an 
event in our sample with these types of crises if at least one of their yearly crisis indicators 
appeared between the peak and the trough that define the corresponding stock-market crash or 
depression.  For example, the United States has a currency crisis during 1929–31 and a banking 
crisis during 1929–33.  We therefore considered the matched event of the Great Depression for 
the United States (formed by the combined stock-market crash spanning 1929–31 and depression 
spanning 1929–33) as belonging to the category of events occurring in the context of a currency 
                                                            
8We found that similar information was conveyed by a currency crisis or a banking crisis; therefore, we do not 
distinguish these two types of events in our present discussion. 
9A preliminary version of this data set was kindly made available to us by the authors. Currency crises are defined as 
annual depreciations of the exchange rate (versus a relevant anchor currency, typically the U.S. dollar) by 15 percent 
or more.  Banking crises are broadly defined as events characterized by substantial bank runs and governmental 
closures or takeovers of financial institutions.  See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).  For Switzerland, we used an 
updated version of the data from Bordo et al. (2001), whose original version is available at 
http://michael.bordo.googlepages.com/home3 11 
 
or banking crisis.  Other events taking place during the Great Depression that showed only one 
of these indicators were also classified in this category; for example, Canada (which had a 
currency crisis) and France (which had a banking crisis). 
  The category of global crisis reflects the degree to which an event occurred for a country 
in isolation or in tandem with other countries.  To measure “globalness,” we assigned for every 
year a score equal to the proportion of countries that were in a disaster state (gauged by a stock-
market crash or a depression).  In turn, for each event in our sample, we averaged the scores of 
the years covering its duration.  A stock-market crash or a depression, or the combination of 
both, was classified as part of a global crisis if that average was above 50 percent; in other 
words, if the event took place mostly during a time when more than half of the countries in our 
sample were also undergoing a crisis.  For example, events occurring during the early years of 
WWI (when more than 65 percent of countries in our sample were undergoing a disaster) were 
classified in the global-crisis category.  In contrast, Mexico’s matched event of the mid 1990s or 
Finland’s earlier in that decade were not in the global-crisis category because fewer than 30 
percent of the countries in our sample were in a disaster state at those times. 
  The results in columns 3–5 in Table 3, part C show that during a currency or banking 
crisis the odds of a depression conditional on the occurrence of a stock-market crash are higher 
than in the overall non-war sample considered in Part B.  The conditional probability of a minor 
depression is now 0.31, while that of a major depression is now 0.04.  The odds of minor and 
major depressions are also higher if the non-war sample is restricted to events occurring during 
global crises (see columns 6–7), coincidentally also at 0.31 and 0.04, respectively, for a –0.25 or 
worse stock-market crash.  
  The categories can be combined to compute the conditional probability of a depression 
given that a stock-market crash occurred during non-war times in the context of a currency or 
banking crisis and in the midst of a global crisis (as shown in columns 9–11 of Table 3).  In this 
case, the conditional probability of a 0.10 depression is 0.46 and of a 0.25 depression is 0.08. 
These odds are almost twice as large as those estimated by restricting the sample only to non-war 
cases.  For larger stock-market crashes, the odds of a minor depression in these combined 
circumstances are above 0.50. 12 
 
Once again, we can apply these results to the 2008–09 economic context, which we 
classify as non-war.  Many countries experienced a currency or banking crisis in these years.  
The crises have also been global in terms of the number of countries in distress.  As we have 
seen, the conditional probability of a 0.10 depression given a stock-market crash (–0.25 or less) 
is 22 percent for the standard non-war sample.  Restricting the non-war sample to events 
occurring in the context of a currency or banking crisis raises these odds to 31 percent.  Further 
conditioning these crises to times of global turmoil takes the odds to 46 percent.  Thus, there was 
legitimate reason for most countries to worry about depression potential early in 2009 (although 
most observers subsequently became more optimistic). 
 
III.  Rare Disasters and the Equity Premium 
 
  The analysis in Barro and Ursúa (2008) followed the approach of Mehra and Prescott 
(1985), Rietz (1988), and Barro (2006) in asking whether a model calibrated to include rare 
disasters gets into the right ballpark for explaining observed equity premia.  Based on long-term 
data on real returns on stocks and government bills, the challenge is to explain an average 
levered equity premium of around 7 percent per year.  Correspondingly, with a debt-equity ratio 
of about one-half, the challenge is to explain an unlevered equity premium of around 5 percent. 
 
A.  Asset-Pricing Formulas 
 
  Barro (2009) and Barro and Ursúa (2008) showed that equivalent results for the equity 
premium arose within two tractable models:  a Lucas (1978)-tree model with i.i.d. shocks to 
productivity growth and an AK model with i.i.d. shocks to the depreciation rate (corresponding 
to destruction of “trees”).  In both models, the economy was closed, and government 
consumption was not considered explicitly.  In the former model, the number of trees was fixed, 
GDP and consumption coincided, and the expected growth rate was exogenous.  The latter model 
allowed for endogenous investment (and saving) and growth but had a fixed price of equity 
shares (corresponding to Tobin’s q equaling one). 13 
 
  For present purposes, it is sufficient to provide a brief sketch of the Lucas-tree setting.  
The log of GDP and consumption, Ct, follow the stochastic process: 
(1)      () ( ) .    log log 1 1 1 + + + + + + = t t t t v u g C C  
The random term ut+1 is i.i.d. normal with mean 0 and variance σ
2.  This term reflects “normal” 
economic fluctuations.  The parameter  0 ≥ g  is a constant that reflects exogenous productivity 
growth.  The random term vt+1 picks up rare disasters, which occur with a constant probability 
0 ≥ p  per unit of time.  In a disaster, output contracts instantaneously by the fraction b, where 
1 0 < <b .  Thus, the distribution of vt+1 is given by 
    probability  p − 1 :   0 1 = + t v , 
    probability  p:   ( ) b vt − = + 1 log 1 . 
The disaster size, b, follows some probability distribution, gauged by the empirical distribution 
of these sizes.  (Barro and Jin [2009] find that this size distribution is well described, above some 
cutoff value, by a power-law distribution.) 
  The representative household has preferences given by an Epstein-Zin-Weil utility 
function, as developed by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990).  This specification separates 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, denoted γ, from the reciprocal of the intertemporal-
elasticity-of-substitution (IES) for consumption, denoted θ.  Hence, the framework allows for 
values of γ that are large enough (in the range of 3–4) to accord with observed equity premia.  In 
addition (unlike with the usual power-utility formulation when  1 γ > ),  1 IES>  is possible.  This 
condition is important because it is required to generate some plausible properties of equity 
prices—in particular, if  1 IES> , a once-and-for-all increase in uncertainty (a rise in p or σ or an 
outward shift in the distribution of b) reduces the price-dividend ratio for unlevered equity, 
whereas a once-and-for-all rise in the expected growth rate (reflecting an increase in g) raises 
this ratio.  The condition  1 IES< , although often assumed, generates the reverse, implausible 
properties for the price-dividend ratio.  For further analysis, including discussion of empirical 
evidence on the IES, see Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Barro (2009). 14 
 
  Because the growth-rate shocks are i.i.d. (equation [1]), the model with Epstein-Zin-Weil 
utility satisfies an asset-pricing condition of familiar form (see Barro [2009] for a derivation): 













= t t t t C R E C , 
where Rt is the gross, one-period return on any asset.  Two key points are, first, the negative 
exponent on Ct and Ct+1 is γ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, not θ, the reciprocal of the 
IES, and, second, the effective rate of time preference, denoted ρ*, differs from the usual rate,  
denoted ρ, when γ and θ diverge.
10   
  Equation (2) can be used to derive the equity premium in the model.  As the length of the 
(arbitrary) period approaches zero, the formula becomes 
(3)      ( ) [ ] { }         1 1 γσ
γ 2 − − ⋅ ⋅ + = −
− b b E p r r
f e
  , 
where 
e r  is the (constant) expected rate of return on unlevered equity, and 
f r  is the (constant) 
risk-free rate.  The first term on the right-hand side, γσ
2, corresponds to the equity premium in 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) and is trivial for reasonable values of γ and σ.  Barro (2006) and 
Barro and Ursúa (2008) show that, if γ is 3–4, the second term can explain an unlevered equity 
premium of around 5 percent when p and the distribution of b are calibrated from the sample of 
observed macroeconomic disasters, analogous to those shown in Table 2. 
  In the model, unlevered equity prices have the same volatility as GDP and consumption.  
Levered equity prices have more volatility but not enough more to explain the observed variance 
of stock prices.  Explaining this “excess volatility” requires some underlying parameter 
involving uncertainty or expected growth to move around.  For example, Gabaix (2008) relies on 
movements in p, whereas Bansal and Yaron (2004) rely on shifts in long-run growth rates, g.  If 
these shifts are temporary and orthogonal to contemporaneous consumption, the model’s 
implications for the average equity premium do not change a lot from the formula in equation 
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1 γ σ 2 1 ) θ γ ( ρ * ρ
γ 1 2 b E
p
g , where E is the expectations 
operator. 15 
 
(3).  Thus, this extended framework may explain the average equity premium along with the high 
volatility of stock prices. 
  Another issue is that the empirical applications of the model in Mehra and Prescott 
(1985), Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), and Barro and Ursúa (2008) do not consider the observed 
time series of stock returns, except to gauge the average equity premium.  In equation (3), in the 
last term on the right-hand side, the first “b” represents the proportionate negative effect of a 
disaster on real stock prices (occurring at an instant of time when the period length approaches 
zero).  The term ()
γ 1
− −b  can be viewed heuristically (not literally in an Epstein-Zin-Weil setup) 
as the marginal utility of consumption in a disaster state expressed as a ratio to the marginal 
utility in a normal state.  The “b” that appears here represents the proportional loss of 
consumption during a disaster.  The previous applications assume that the two b’s are the same—
because, in the model, a disaster causes unlevered stock prices to decrease in the same proportion 
as consumption and GDP.   
  A different, complementary approach uses the observed time series of stock returns 
during crises (and, perhaps, also at other times) to calibrate an analog to the last term on the 
right-hand side of equation (3).  More formally, the equation can be replaced by a familiar 
looking formula that involves the covariance between stock returns and an asset-pricing factor, 
which depends on ()
γ 1
− −b , where b is the proportionate fall of consumption during a disaster.
 
  Consider the asset-pricing condition in equation (2) when applied over a period of length 
T years.  Let RT be the gross return on any asset from the time t to  T t + .  Equation (2) implies 
(4)     ()
γ γ







































R COV  , 
where COV is the covariance operator.
11  When applied to the gross risk-free return, 
f
T R , the 
result is 
                                                            
11 Equation (2) applies in the Epstein-Zin-Weil setting only when the shocks to consumption growth are i.i.d.  In this 
case, the covariance and the expectations shown in equation (4) and subsequent expressions will be time invariant; 
that is, they do not have to be conditioned on t. 16 
 


































from equation (5) into equation (4) yields 
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  We can verify that equation (6) implies equation (3) as the period length, T, approaches 
zero, when RT is the gross return on Lucas-tree equity (a perpetual consumption claim) and Ct is 
generated from equation (1).  The derivation of equation (3) from equation (6) relies on the 
condition (implied by equation [1]) that the proportionate change in unlevered equity prices 
always equals the proportionate change in consumption.  Instead of imposing this condition, we 
can implement equation (6) directly by computing the covariance between gross stock returns 













.  Since this approach uses observed returns on levered 
equity, the left-hand side of equation (6) will refer to the levered equity premium, empirically 
averaging around 7 percent per year (see Barro and Ursúa [2008, section II]).  That is, the model 
has to generate a higher equity premium than before, where the target was the 5 percent value 
corresponding to the estimated average unlevered equity premium. 
 
B.  Covariance Calculations 
 
  Our first approach implements equation (6) with all of the available long-term data for 25 
countries on gross real stock returns, RT, and consumption ratios,  t T t C C + .  (We omitted five 
countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Greece, and Indonesia—that have large or unconnected 
gaps in the stock-return series.)  These calculations use various period lengths, T (in years), and 
coefficients of relative risk aversion, γ.
12  This analysis measures consumption changes from the 
                                                            
12 For cases of missing stock-return data, as described in n.3, we computed multi-year real returns across the gaps. 17 
 
data on real per capita consumer expenditure; that is, we use no GDP data.  In the main analysis, 
we interact the consumption ratio,  t T t C C + , computed from annual data for years t and  T t + , 
with returns, RT, calculated from the end of year  1 − t  to the end of year  1 − +T t .
13  T o  
implement equation (6), we use ρ*=0.029 per year (from Barro and Ursúa [2008, Table 10]).  
However, for small values of T (such as  1 = T  year), the results depend little on ρ*. 
  The bottom line is that these calculations yield equity premia that are too low by a factor 
of around 10, compared with the target of 0.07 per year for the levered equity premium.  For 
example, with  029 . 0 * ρ = ,  1 = T  and  5 . 3 γ = , there are 2401 observations, the covariance is  
–0.006, and the equity premium is 0.006 per year.  For  2 = T  and  5 . 3 γ = , there are 2381 
(overlapping) observations, the covariance is –0.011, and the equity premium is 0.005 per year.  
If we shift the timing to measure returns from the end of year t to the end of year  T t +  or from 
the end of year  2 − t  to the end of year  2 − +T t , the computed equity premia are even smaller. 
  We know from Barro and Ursúa (2008, Tables 10 and 11) that the calibrated results for 
the equity premium depend mostly on the cases of extreme macroeconomic contraction.  These 
events, with contractions of size 0.10 or more, are the ones shown in Table 2 for 30 countries.  
Examination of Panel A, which has the 71 cases of paired stock-market crashes and depressions, 
suggests two key properties.  First, crashes and depressions usually arise as multi-year events—
but this feature was already captured in the covariance analysis by allowing for period lengths, T, 
that exceeded one year.  Second, the timing between the stock-market crashes and the 
depressions is irregular.  That is, unlike our covariance calculations, the matches do not always 
refer to the same timing, such as relating consumption changes between year t and year  T t +  to 
gross stock returns from the end of year  1 − t  to the end of year  1 − +T t . 
  A prototypical case is the United States during the Great Depression—the stock return is 
–0.55 for 1929–31 (gross return of 0.45), and the macroeconomic contraction is 0.25 for 1929–
33.  This pattern—with the strongly negative stock return applying slightly prior to or coincident 
with the macro contraction—also applies to other cases in Table 2, panel A.  Examples include 
Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom in World War II; Argentina, Austria, 
                                                            
13 We could get a better match in the timing between consumption changes and stock returns if we used the monthly 
data on stock returns that are available for some countries and time periods.  This extension is worth pursuing, but 
we doubt that the results will change a lot. 18 
 
Chile, France, Germany, Indonesia, Mexico, and Spain during the Great Depression; Canada 
over the period of World War I and the Great Influenza Epidemic; Norway, Sweden, and the 
United States during this epidemic; Germany at the end of the hyperinflation in 1922–23; India 
during its 1947–48 conflict with Pakistan; Chile in the 1970s; Chile, Mexico, and Peru in the 
1980s; Finland in the early 1990s; and Indonesia during the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 
1990s. 
  Some cases that deviate from this prototypical pattern can be explained by measurement 
issues.  For example, the need to bridge the gaps in the stock-return data for Mexico 1915–18, 
Belgium in World Wars I and II, Portugal 1974–77, and Spain 1936–40 likely explains the 
patterns in which the negative stock returns appear to lag the macroeconomic declines.  The 
same consideration applies to missing stock-return data for Austria during World War II. 
  Other cases are likely to be affected strongly by wartime controls on prices and other 
variables.  An extreme example is Germany during World War II, where the controls—holding 
down reported consumer prices starting in 1936 and propping up reported stock prices starting in 
1943—lapsed only in 1948.  The measured real stock return for 1948, –0.89, is misleadingly low, 
particularly because the controls prevented the posted nominal stock prices from falling earlier.  
Correspondingly, during the war and through 1947, the underestimation of true inflation and the 
propping up of reported stock prices led to a substantial overstatement of real returns.  These 
considerations likely explain why the real stock return of –0.91 shown for 1944–48 in Table 2, 
panel A appears to lag the macroeconomic decline of 0.41 for 1939–45.  Moreover, an important 
point is that longer-term real returns that bridge the controls are likely to be satisfactory.  For 
example, the measured, cumulative real stock return in Germany for 1939–48 of –0.85 is 
probably accurate. 
  Analogous effects from price controls likely arise for France and other countries during 
World War II and, perhaps also, World War I.
14  For France (also affected by missing data for 
1940–41), the cumulative real return for 1939–47 is –0.41.  This gauge, which bridges the 
                                                            
14 For the United States, in a case not included in Table 2, the measured real stock return of –0.25 for 1946–47 is 
likely to be far below the “true” value because of the unwinding of price controls from 1945 to 1948.  Barro (1978, 
Table 2) estimates that the “true” price level was 53 percent above the reported value in 1945, 21 percent above in 
1946, and 8 percent above in 1947.  Conversely, during the war, the controls led to an understatement of inflation 
and, hence, to an overestimate of real stock returns.   19 
 
missing data and the likely price controls, is probably reliable.  In contrast, there is an apparent 
mismatch in timing between the reported real stock return of –0.69 shown for 1943–45 in Table 
2, panel A and the macroeconomic contraction of 0.58 for 1938–43.  Again, measurement 
problems likely explain the mismatch. 
  These considerations suggest that an alternative way to evaluate the formula for the 
equity premium in equation (6) is to focus on the 71 cases of paired stock-market crashes and 
depressions (Table 2, panel A) and to calculate the covariance in a flexible way that allows for 
different timing for each case.  Essentially, we compute the cross product between the demeaned 
values of the stock returns shown in column 3 and the macro contractions shown in column 5.
15  
Then, in applying the result to equation (6), we measure the period length, T, as the average 
duration (4.9 years) for the 71 paired cases.  Subsequently, we go further by bringing into the 
calculation the additional 190 cases that had either a stock-market crash or a depression but not 
both (of which 161 had a stock-market crash and 29—those shown in Table 2, panel B—had a 
depression). 
  In the first application of the method, we begin by computing the covariance for the 71 
paired cases shown in Table 2, panel A.  To carry out this calculation, we use the values shown 
in columns 3 and 5 to express each gross stock return (one plus the rate of return) and 













, as a deviation from the respective overall sample 
mean.
16  (We use values of γ equal to 3, 3.5, and 4.)  Then we add up the cross terms and divide 
by the number of cases, 71, to compute the sample covariance.  To get the contribution to the 
overall covariance, we multiply by the weight applicable to the matched sample.  This weight, 
denoted pT, is the ratio of the number of years in the 71-case sample (349, corresponding to an 
average duration of  9 . 4 = T  years) to the total sample years (3037).  The result is  115 . 0 = T p , 
shown on the first line of Table 4.  To calculate the term on the right-hand side of equation (6), 
we multiply 0.115 by the 71-case covariance and then divide by ( )
T * ρ 1+ , using ρ*=0.029 per 
                                                            
15 In these calculations, we did not adjust for price controls, such as in Germany and France, by measuring real stock 
returns over longer periods than those shown in Table 2, panel A.  Such adjustments, in conjunction with a 
systematic analysis of price controls, might improve the results. 
16 For example, for the United States 1929–31, the gross real stock return of 0.45 is taken as a deviation from 1.28, 
which is the overall sample mean for the 25 countries without large gaps in the stock-return data of gross real stock 
returns over 3-year periods. 20 
 
year, as before, and  9 . 4 = T  years.  Using  9 . 4 = T  again on the left-hand side of equation (6), 
we then compute the equity premium, expressed per year. 
  The results for the full sample under the three assumed values of γ are shown on the first 
line of Table 4, Part A.  The computed levered equity premium is 0.043 per year when γ=3, 
0.061 when γ=3.5, and 0.085 when γ=4.  Thus, the model accords with the observed average 
levered equity premium of 0.07 if γ is between 3.5 and 4.  Note that this match relies only on the 
behavior during the 71 matched stock-market crashes and depressions.  Implicitly, the 
contribution to the covariance from the other 2688 years in the sample is taken to be roughly 
zero. 
The model still gets into the right ballpark for the equity premium with a coefficient of 
relative risk aversion, γ, of 4 or less if the sample is restricted in various ways.  Table 4 considers 
samples limited to cases of standard stock-market crashes (–0.25 or worse) and large depressions 
(0.25 or more), cases of large stock-market crashes (–0.40 or worse) and large depressions (0.25 
or more), cases of war, and cases involving a currency or banking crisis.  These results are shown 
in lines 2–5 of Table 4, Part A.  As an example, in the war sample,  T p  is reduced to 0.052, yet 
the computed equity premia for values of γ between 3.5 and 4 are in the range between 0.051 
and 0.073. 
  The last line of Table 4, Part A, repeats the calculations for a sample limited to the 20 
OECD countries (which have a total of 2152 observations).  The computed equity premia are 
somewhat larger than those from the full sample—0.049 when γ=3, 0.071 when γ=3.5, and 0.101 
when  γ=4.  Although the weight,  096 . 0 = T p , is smaller for the OECD than for the overall 
sample, the OECD also exhibits a higher frequency of very large macroeconomic contractions.  
This last consideration turns out to dominate and leads, thereby, to a higher equity premium for 
the OECD than for the full sample.  For the OECD, a value for γ of 3.5 is adequate to roughly 
match the observed average levered equity premium of 0.07. 
  Part B of Table 4 shows the results with the larger sample of events that includes stock-
market crashes without depressions and depressions without stock-market crashes.  Thus, there 
are now 261 events for 30 countries and 164 events for 20 OECD countries.  The fraction,  T p , of 
the overall sample years contained in these sub-samples is much larger than before—0.31 for the 21 
 
30 countries and 0.27 for the OECD.  However, since the covariance between stock returns and 
macro contractions is not so high in the newly added group (because these events were selected 
not to have pairings of stock-market crashes with depressions), the incremental contribution to 
the computed equity premium is positive but modest in size.  For the full group of countries, the 
equity premium is now 0.050 at γ=3, 0.070 at γ=3.5, and 0.098 at γ=4.  For the OECD, the 
results are 0.057 at γ=3, 0.081 at γ=3.5, and 0.116 at γ=4.  Thus, γ=3.5 is now more clearly 
adequate to match the target value of 0.07. 
  Another 69 percent of the sample years for the 30 countries (73 percent for the OECD) 
are contained neither in a stock-market crash nor a depression.  We have not studied in detail the 
contribution of this part of the sample to the computed equity premium.  However, we can get an 
idea of the effect by calculating the covariance between the one-year stock returns and the asset-
pricing factors, ()
γ −
+ t t C C 1 .  That is, we use our initial approach for computing the covariance but 
look here only at the years not contained within a stock-market crash or a depression.  The result 
when γ=3.5 is that the covariance is –0.005 for this sample when applied to 25 countries and –
0.003 for 18 OECD countries (where we omit the 5 countries with large or unconnected gaps in 
the stock-return data).  Weighting by the fraction of the overall years in the sample (0.69 for the 
overall group and 0.73 for the OECD) implies that the incremental contribution to the equity 
premium is 0.003 for the overall group and 0.002 for the OECD.  Thus, by these calculations, the 
inclusion of the rest of the sample years in the analysis has a positive, but minor, impact on the 
equity premia reported in Table 4. 
  The bottom line is that a “flexible covariance analysis” applied to the asset-pricing 
formula in equation (6) generates a reasonable levered equity premium if the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion, γ, is around 3.5.  The main element in this computation is the flexible 
interpretation of the timing between stock-market crashes and depressions during the small 
number of paired, multi-year events (71 in our sample). 
  This conclusion accords with the one reached by Barro and Ursúa (2008, Tables 10 
and  11), who followed Mehra and Prescott (1985) by considering only the sizes of 
macroeconomic contractions and not the covariance with stock returns.  This previous analysis 
looked at multi-year depressions but did not require measurement of the timing between 22 
 
depressions and stock-market crashes.  In other words, the assumption that prices of unlevered 
equity claims move in the same proportion as consumption (aside from temporary orthogonal 
noise) substituted for the complexities associated with matching the timing of stock returns and 
consumption changes. 
  A key point is that the covariance calculation that “works” for the equity premium relies 
almost entirely on the roughly 12 percent of the time-series observations that apply to matched 
stock-market crashes and depressions (Table 2, panel A).  The inclusion of the additional 19 
percent of the observations that feature unmatched stock-market crashes and depressions has a 
minor effect (Table 4, Part B), and the consideration of the remaining 69 percent of the data from 
“normal times” has a trivial effect.  We think that further refinement of the results should focus 
even more on the 12 percent of the data that matters for the equity premium.  In particular, we 
need to consider more rigorously how to carry out a covariance analysis that allows for flexible 
timing between stock returns and consumption changes.  An important part of this analysis is to 
deal more satisfactorily with periods of missing annual data and with the price controls that 
characterize many of the wartime crises. 
 
IV.  Conclusions and Future Research 
 
  The long-term history for 30 countries indicates that stock-market crashes (cumulative 
real returns of –0.25 or worse) have substantial predictive power for depressions (cumulative 
macroeconomic declines by 10 percent or more).  In a non-war environment, the realization of a 
stock-market return of –0.25 or worse implies that the probability of a minor depression 
(macroeconomic decline by 10 percent or more) is 22 percent, and the probability of a major 
depression (decline by 25 percent or more) is 3 percent.  When the stock return is –0.40 or 
worse, the corresponding depression probabilities are 30 percent and 4 percent.  The probabilities 
are 46 percent and 8 percent, respectively, when a stock-market crash of –0.25 or worse in a non-
war period is accompanied by a currency or banking crisis and occurs during a time of global 
economic turmoil.  Given the stock-market crashes for the United States and other countries in 
2008 (characterized as non-war, featuring a currency or banking crisis, and occurring during a 
global event), these last probabilities applied at the beginning of 2009. 23 
 
  The long-term data also show that the majority (67 percent) of minor, non-war 
depressions are accompanied by stock-market crashes, whereas most major, non-war depressions 
(83 percent) are accompanied by these crashes.  Therefore, in the absence of a stock-market 
crash, the occurrence of a depression is highly unlikely. 
  The full history of 3037 annual observations reveals 71 matched cases of stock-market 
crashes and depressions, of which 41 percent are associated with war.  The years contained in the 
71 cases constitute 12 percent of the overall sample (because the average duration of a crisis was 
4.9 years).  The co-movement between stock returns and macroeconomic changes for the 71 
cases may be sufficient to explain the observed equity premium of 7 percent, assuming that the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion is between 3.5 and 4.  The required coefficient falls to 3.5 or 
less if we bring in the additional 19 percent of the sample that features a stock-market crash or 
depression but not both.  A crucial aspect of this analysis is that the computed covariances allow 
for a flexible timing pattern between stock returns and macroeconomic changes.  In future 
research, we plan to assess this flexible covariance approach in more detail.  Part of this research 
involves the roles of missing data and wartime price controls, which can distort the covariances 
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Table 1  U.S. Stock-Market Crashes since 1869 

















1907–07 0.32  1906–08  0.04 1906–08 0.10 1906–08 0.07 
1916–20 0.47  1917–21  0.16 1918–21 0.12 1917–21 0.16 
1929–31 0.55  1929–33  0.21 1929–33 0.29 1929–33 0.25 
1937–37 0.37  1937–38  0.02 1937–38 0.04 1937–38 0.03 
1939–41 0.29 1941–42 0.03 1939–40 –0.08  1941–42 0.03 
1973–74 0.49  1973–74  0.02 1973–75 0.03 1973–75 0.02 
2000–02 0.42 2000–01  –0.01 2000–01 0.00 2000–01  –0.01 
2008–08  0.37  ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Notes:  Underlying stock returns are real rates of return (arithmetic) from end of previous year to 
end of current year.  Stock return in column 2 is cumulated real return (all negative) over period 
shown in column 1.  For example, 1929–31 refers to the cumulated return from the end of 1928 
to the end of 1931.  The cases selected are those with returns ≤ –0.25.  C in columns 3 and 4 is 
real per capita consumer expenditure.  Contraction in column 4 is cumulated fractional decline 
over period shown in column 3.  For example, 1929–33 refers to the ratio of consumer 
expenditure in 1933 (annual average) to that in 1929 (annual average).  GDP is real per capita 
GDP.  Contraction in column 6 is cumulated fractional decline over period shown in column 5.  
Macro contraction in column 8 is the average for C and GDP for non-war cases and C value for 
wars and war aftermaths.  The macro period in column 7 is the overlap for C and GDP when the 
macro contraction is the average for C and GDP.  When only C is used, the macro period 
corresponds to that for C.  For the United States, there are no other macroeconomic contractions 
of size 0.10 or more.  (The period 1913–14 has a GDP contraction of 0.10 but a C contraction of 
only 0.05—the stock return for 1913–14 is –0.16.) 27 
 
 
Table 2  Depressions with and without Stock-Market Crashes 
(30 countries with long-term data on stock returns and macro aggregates) 
Panel A:  Stock-Market Crashes and Depressions (71) 










Australia  1929–30 0.25  1926–32  0.23 
Austria  1929–33 0.48  1929–34  0.23 
  1947–50* 0.84  1941–45  0.59 
Belgium  1914–18* 0.76  1913–18  0.46 
  1929–31 0.48  1930–34  0.10 
  1937–39 0.26  1937–42  0.53 
  1942–48* 0.74  1942–46  0.13 
Canada  1916–20 0.27  1918–21  0.20 
  1929–32 0.54  1928–33  0.29 
Denmark  1917–17 0.27  1914–18  0.12 
  1919–22 0.60  1919–21  0.24 
  1937–40 0.27  1939–41  0.26 
Finland  1989–91 0.47  1989–93  0.13 
France  1913–20 0.62  1912–18  0.25 
  1929–31 0.46  1929–35  0.12 
  1943–45 0.69  1938–43  0.58 
Germany  1914–20 0.91  1912–18  0.42 
  1922–22 0.63  1922–23  0.13 
  1929–31 0.52  1928–32  0.20 
  1944–48 0.91  1939–45  0.41 
Greece  1939–40* 0.37  1939–42  0.66 
Italy  1944–45 0.89  1939–45  0.35 
Japan  1897–98 0.54  1899–06  0.12 
  1943–47 0.97  1937–45  0.64 
Netherlands  1918–22 0.47  1912–18  0.44 
  1944–46* 0.42  1939–44  0.54 
Norway  1917–18 0.36  1916–18  0.17 
  1919–21 0.55  1919–21  0.16 
Portugal  1974–78* 0.97  1974–76  0.10 
Spain  1929–31 0.53  1929–33  0.10 
  1935–40* 0.43  1935–37  0.46 
  1935–40* 0.43  1940–45  0.14 
Sweden  1917–18 0.60  1913–18  0.13 
  1919–20 0.30  1920–21  0.13 
  1939–40 0.26  1939–45  0.14 28 
 
Switzerland  1914–20* 0.68  1912–18  0.15 
  1939–40 0.28  1939–45  0.15 
United Kingdom  1912–20 0.60  1915–18  0.17 
  1937–40 0.41  1938–43  0.17 
United States  1916–20 0.47  1917–21  0.16 
  1929–31 0.55  1929–33  0.25 
Non-OECD countries 
Argentina  1910–17 0.53  1912–17  0.24 
  1929–32 0.48  1928–32  0.19 
  1949–52 0.82  1948–53  0.12 
  1980–82 0.56  1980–82  0.11 
  1986–87 0.33  1987–90  0.15 
  2000–01 0.37  1998–02  0.24 
Brazil  1990–90 0.67  1987–92  0.14 
Chile  1929–31 0.40  1929–32  0.37 
  1972–72 0.27  1972–76  0.40 
  1981–84 0.56  1981–85  0.25 
Colombia  1931–31 0.28  1929–32  0.11 
India  1940–42 0.30  1937–42  0.13 
  1940–42 0.30  1943–46  0.13 
  1946–49 0.49  1947–50  0.18 
Indonesia  1928–31 0.54  1930–33  0.11 
  1997–98 0.69  1997–99  0.12 
Mexico  1909–18* 0.79  1909–16  0.25 
  1924–31 0.55  1926–32  0.31 
  1980–82 0.81  1981–88  0.14 
  1994–96 0.38  1994–95  0.10 
Peru  1967–76 0.66  1975–79  0.14 
  1981–82 0.86  1981–83  0.11 
  1987–88 0.76  1987–92  0.31 
Venezuela  1946–47 0.28  1948–52  0.14 
  1958–61 0.34  1957–64  0.19 
  1977–81 0.65  1977–86  0.28 
  1988–89 0.70  1988–89  0.10 
  1992–95 0.55  1992–99  0.11 
  1997–2001 0.60  2001–03  0.16 




Panel B:  Depressions without Stock-Market Crashes (29) 










Australia  1889–89 0.02  1889–95  0.27 
  1915–15 0.16  1913–18  0.24 
  1940–41 0.09  1938–44  0.30 
Canada  1907–07 0.09  1906–08  0.10 
  1913–14 0.18  1912–15  0.13 
Denmark  1947–48 0.07  1946–48  0.14 
Finland  1928–29 0.12  1928–32  0.13 
  1939–39 0.05  1938–42  0.24 
France  1871–71 0.12  1864–71  0.16 
  1882–85 0.13  1882–86  0.11 
New Zealand  1930–31 0.13  1929–32  0.18 
  1940–40 0.01  1939–44  0.22 
Norway  1939–40 0.05  1939–44  0.15 
Portugal  1936–36 –0.03  1934–36  0.13 
  1937–40 0.22  1939–42  0.10 
Spain  1896–96 0.07  1892–96  0.15 
Non-OECD countries 
Argentina  1900–00 0.03  1899–1900  0.17 
Brazil  1908–08 0.07  1907–09  0.11 
  1929–31 0.20  1928–31  0.15 
Chile  1913–15 0.08  1911–15  0.21 
  1920–20 0.05  1918–22  0.15 
Colombia  1940–41 0.03  1939–43  0.14 
Mexico  1920–20 0.12  1921–24  0.12 
Peru  1930–32 0.18  1929–32  0.20 
South Africa  1914–15 0.08  1912–17  0.23 
  1931–32 0.15  1928–32  0.12 
  1981–81 0.12  1981–87  0.10 
Venezuela  1932–32* 0.04  1930–33  0.24 
 1942–42  0.03  1939–42  0.11 
 
Notes:  See notes to Table 1 on measures of stock returns and macroeconomic contractions.  
Panel A shows the 71 paired cases with stock-market crashes (cumulative returns of –0.25 or 
less) and depressions (macroeconomic contractions of 0.10 or more).  Panel B shows the 29 
cases of macro contractions not accompanied by stock-market crashes.  Not shown are 161 cases 30 
 
with stock-market crashes unaccompanied by depressions.  Stock-market periods with asterisks 
include interpolated or missing stock returns.  Bold for macro period indicates wartime interval 
(limited to active combatants). 
For most non-war cases, macro contractions are the average of the contractions shown by 
consumer expenditure, C, and GDP.  When C data are missing, macro contractions were based 
on GDP except for war aftermaths (which were left as missing data) and during wars when the 
indicated GDP fall was less than 0.10 (also left as missing data).  For wartime contractions, when 
C and GDP data were available, the macro contraction was based on C when this decline was 
greater than that in GDP.  When the GDP decline was larger, the macro contraction was 
computed as the average of the C and GDP contractions.  Annual data on stock returns were 
missing (typically because of closed markets) for Belgium 1914–18 and 1944–46, Mexico 1915–
18, Netherlands 1944–46, Spain 1936–40, Portugal 1974–77, and Switzerland 1914–16.  The 
stock returns that include these periods were based on cumulative, multi-year returns over 
periods that bridged the gaps in the annual data.  Stock-return data are also missing for Argentina 




Table 3  Frequencies of Stock-Market Crashes and Depressions 
Part A:  Non-War and War Observations Combined 












100  71 (.31, .71) 
0.15  59  43 (.19, .73) 
0.20  40  31 (.13, .78) 
0.25  25  23 (.10, .92) 




100  50 (.40, .50) 
0.15  59  30 (.24, .51) 
0.20  40  22 (.18, .55) 
0.25  25  18 (.15, .72) 




100  38 (.48, .38) 
0.15  59  22 (.28, .37) 
0.20  40  18 (.23, .45) 
0.25  25  15 (.19, .60) 
0.30  17  9 (.11, .53) 




57  41 (.28, .72) 
0.15  37  28 (.19, .76) 
0.20  26  21 (.14, .81) 
0.25  18  16 (.11, .89) 




57  31 (.39, .54) 
0.15  37  21 (.27, .57) 
0.20  26  16 (.20, .62) 
0.25  18  13 (.16, .72) 




57  21 (.45, .37) 
0.15  37  15 (.32, .41) 
0.20  26  12 (.26, .46) 
0.25  18  10 (.21, .56) 




Part B:  Non-War and War Observations Compared 
    Numbers of Events 
    Non-war only  War only 






  Depression Both  Stock
  Depression Both 




63  42 (.22, .67) 
40 
37  29 (.73, .78) 
0.15  30  21 (.11, .70)  29  22 (.55, .76) 
0.20  17  13 (.07, .76)  23  18 (.45, .78) 
0.25  6  5 (.03, .83)  19  18 (.45, .95) 




63  29 (.30, .46) 
26 
37  21 (.81, .57) 
0.15  30  13 (.13, .43)  29  17 (.65, .59) 
0.20  17  8 (.08, .47)  23  14 (.54, .61) 
0.25  6  4 (.04, .67)  19  14 (.54, .74) 




63  22 (.37, .35) 
19 
37  16 (.84, .43) 
0.15  30  10 (.17, .33)  29  12 (.63, .41) 
0.20  17  7 (.12, .41)  23  11 (.58, .48) 
0.25  6  4 (.07, .67)  19  11 (.58, .58) 





29  20 (.17, .69) 
30 
28  21 (.70, .75) 
0.15  14  11 (.09, .79)  23  17 (.57, .74) 
0.20  8  7 (.06, .88)  18  14 (.47, .78) 
0.25  3  2 (.02, .67)  15  14 (.47, .93) 




29  15 (.25, .52) 
19 
28  16 (.84, .57) 
0.15  14  8 (.13, .57)  23  13 (.68, .57) 
0.20  8  5 (.08, .63)  18  11 (.58, .61) 
0.25  3  2 (.03, .67)  15  11 (.58, .73) 




29  9 (.28, .31) 
15 
28  12 (.80, .43) 
0.15  14  6 (.19, .43)  23  9 (.60, .39) 
0.20  8  4 (.13, .50)  18  8 (.53, .44) 
0.25  3  2 (.06, .67)  15  8 (.53, .53) 






Part C:  Types of Crises Compared (Non-War Sample) 
   Numbers of events 
   Currency or Banking 
Crisis  Global Event  Currency or Banking 
Crisis & Global 




≥  S. D.  Both  S. D.  Both  S. D.  Both 




48  36 (.31, .75) 
75 
33  23 (.31, .70) 
37 
21  17 (.46, .81) 
0.15  24  19 (.17, .79)  19  14 (.19, .74)  15  12 (.32, .80) 
0.20  14  11 (.10, .79)  11  9 (.12, .82)  8  7 (.19, .88) 
0.25  6  5 (.04, .83)  3  3 (.04, 1.0)  3  3 (.08, 1.0) 




48  28 (.41, .58) 
43 
33  13 (.30, .39) 
24 
21  12 (.50, .57) 
0.15  24  13 (.19, .54)  19  8 (.19, .42)  15  8 (.33, .53) 
0.20  14  8 (.12, .57)  11  4 (.09, .36)  8  4 (.17, .50) 
0.25  6  4 (.06, .67)  3  2 (.05, .67)  3  2 (.08, .67) 




48  21 (.46, .44) 
22 
33  9 (.41, .27) 
14 
21  8 (.57, .38) 
0.15  24  10 (.22, .42)  19  6 (.27, .32)  15  6 (.43, .40) 
0.20  14  7 (.15, .50)  11  4 (.18, .36)  8  4 (.29, .50) 
0.25  6  4 (.09, .67)  3  2 (.09, .67)  3  2 (.14, .67) 
0.30  1  0 (.00, --)  1  0 (.00, --)  1  0 (.00, --) 
 
Notes:  Part A combines non-war and war events.  Part B considers non-war and war events 
separately (where “war” indicates that the period of macroeconomic contraction overlaps with 
active combat status in a major inter-state or intra-state conflict). Part C considers non-war 
events with currency or banking crises, global crises, and both categories at the same time.  The 
numbers of events refer to stock-market returns ≤ the amount shown or macro contractions ≥ the 
amount shown or both.  In the last column of part A, columns 5 and 8 of part B, and columns 5, 8 
and 11 of part C, the fractions in parentheses are, first, the frequency of contractions ≥ the 
amount shown, given that the stock return is ≤ the amount shown, and, second, the frequency of 
stock returns ≤ the amount shown, given that the contraction is ≥ the amount shown. The letters 
S and D in the headings of part C represent Stock-Market Crashes and Depressions, respectively. 34 
 
 
Table 4 Stock-Market Crashes and Depressions, 
Implications for Equity Premium 
Part A: Stock-Market Crashes (returns ≤ –0.25) and Depressions (contractions ≥ 0.10)  
for 30 countries 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sample criterion:  N  T  pT  Equity Premium 
            γ = 3.0 γ  = 3.5 γ  = 4.0 
Full sample  71  4.9 0.115 0.043 0.061 0.085 
   Crash  ≤ –0.25 and Depression ≥ 0.25  23  5.6 0.042 0.035 0.051 0.074 
   Crash ≤ –0.40 and Depression ≥ 0.25  18  6.1 0.036 0.029 0.042 0.061 
   War  29  5.5 0.052 0.034 0.051 0.073 
   Currency or Banking Crisis  61  5.1 0.103 0.042 0.059 0.083 
OECD only (20 countries)  41  5.0 0.096 0.049 0.071 0.101 
Part B: Stock-Market Crashes (returns ≤ –0.25) or Depressions (contractions ≥ 0.10) 
for 30 countries 
Sample criterion:  N  T  pT  Equity Premium 
            γ = 3.0 γ  = 3.5 γ  = 4.0 
Full sample  261 3.6 0.311 0.050 0.070 0.098 
   Crash ≤ –0.25 or Depression ≥ 0.25  234 3.6 0.279 0.049 0.069 0.096 
   Crash ≤ –0.40 or Depression ≥ 0.25  131 4.4 0.189 0.045 0.063 0.088 
   War  48  5.0 0.079 0.036 0.053 0.076 
   Currency or Banking Crisis  162 4.0 0.216 0.047 0.066 0.092 
OECD only (20 countries)  164 3.5 0.270 0.057 0.081 0.116 
 
Notes:  Part A encompasses events for which stock returns are –0.25 or less and macro 
contractions are 0.10 or more (except for the rows where different thresholds are indicated).  
Part B considers cases for which returns are –0.25 or less or macro contractions are 0.10 or more 
(except for the rows where different thresholds are indicated).  (Part A is a subset of Part B.)  N 
in column 2 is the number of occurrences of the state described by the sample criterion in 
column 1.  T in column 3 is the average duration in years of these states.  pT in column 4 is the 
fraction of the total observations (3037 for all countries, 2152 for OECD) represented by the 
selected sample.  The calibrated (levered) equity premium in columns 5–7 is calculated as 
discussed in the text.  The results are for the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, set to 3, 3.5, 
or 4. 
 
 